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U.S. Prepares To Confront Nuclear Ban Treaty With Smart Bombs

In Nuclear abolition, Nuclear Guardianship, Nuclear Policy, Peace, Politics on May 25, 2017 at 2:48 am

Analysis by Rick Wayman*

WASHINGTON, D.C: (IDN) – On May 23, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) issued a press release celebrating President Trump’s proposed 2018 budget. DOE specifically lauded the proposed “$10.2 billion for Weapons Activities to maintain and enhance the safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear weapons enterprise.”

Less than 24 hours earlier, Ambassador Elayne Whyte of Costa Rica released a draft of a treaty banning nuclear weapons. Ambassador Whyte is President of the United Nations Conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination. Over 130 nations have participated in the ban treaty negotiations thus far. A final treaty text is expected by early July.

The draft treaty would prohibit state parties from – among other things – developing, producing, manufacturing, possessing or stockpiling nuclear weapons. The United States has aggressively boycotted the treaty negotiations, and has actively sought to undermine the good faith efforts of the majority of the world’s nations to prohibit these indiscriminate and catastrophically destructive weapons.

No one is surprised at President Trump’s proposed funding for nuclear weapons activities; in fact, it is largely a continuation of the U.S. nuclear “modernization” program that began under President Obama. What is alarming, however, is the tacit admission by the Department of Energy that it is not simply maintaining current U.S. nuclear warheads until such time as they are eliminated. Rather, it is enhancing the “effectiveness” of nuclear weapons by incorporating new military capabilities into new weapons expected to be active through the final decades of the 21st century.

The draft ban treaty makes clear “that the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons transcend national borders, pose grave implications for human survival, the environment, socioeconomic development, the global economy, food security and for the health of future generations.”

Whether or not the United States plans to join the majority of the world’s nations in a treaty banning nuclear weapons, its policies and programs must reflect the indisputable evidence of the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons use. There is simply no excuse for investing in new nuclear weapons instead of an all-out diplomatic push for true security in a world without nuclear weapons.

A Good Faith Obligation

Article VI of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) obligates all parties to negotiate in good faith for an end to the nuclear arms race at an early date. That treaty entered into force over 47 years ago.

The draft ban treaty repeats the unanimous 1996 declaration of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which said, “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.”

Judge Christopher Weeramantry was Vice President of the ICJ when it issued its 1996 Advisory Opinion. In a paper that he wrote for the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation in 2013, he examined in detail the concept of good faith in the context of nuclear disarmament.

He wrote, “There is no half-way house in the duty of compliance with good faith in international law.” He continued, “Disrespect for and breach of good faith grows exponentially if, far from even partial compliance, there is total non-compliance with the obligations it imposes.”

The U.S. and numerous other nuclear-armed countries argue that they are in compliance with their obligations because the total number of nuclear weapons in their arsenals has decreased. Quantitative reductions are important, and the progress on this front has been significant over the past couple of decades. However, a nuclear arms race need not simply be quantitative. Rather, what we see now among many of the nuclear-armed nations is a qualitative nuclear arms race, with enhancements of weapons’ “effectiveness” being a key component.

This qualitative nuclear arms race is a blatant breach of the good faith obligation and, according to Judge Weeramantry’s interpretation, likely even constitutes bad faith.

A Ban Is Coming

Regardless of how much money the United States and other nuclear-armed nations commit to their nuclear arsenals, the vast majority of the world’s nations plan to conclude a treaty banning nuclear weapons in July.

Even though such a treaty will not immediately halt nuclear weapons development or diminish the threat that current nuclear weapon arsenals pose to all humanity, it is an important step in the right direction.

The NPT and customary international law require all nations – not just those that possess nuclear weapons – to negotiate for nuclear disarmament. The ban treaty is the first of many steps needed to fulfill this obligation, and will lay a solid foundation for future multilateral action.

Non-nuclear-armed countries must continue to enhance the effectiveness of their diplomatic arsenals to ensure the successful entry into force of a ban treaty and subsequent measures to finally achieve a world free of nuclear weapons.

Author’s note: Generally speaking, the U.S. Department of Energy is in charge of the design, production and maintenance of nuclear warheads and bombs, while the Department of Defense deals with the delivery systems (ICBMs, submarines, and bomber aircraft) and deployment in additional multi-billion dollar budget lines not addressed in this article. For more information on the Department of Energy’s nuclear “modernization” plans, see the Alliance for Nuclear Accountability’s new report “Accountability Audit.”

*Rick Wayman is Director of Programs & Operations at the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. He also serves on the Board of Directors of the Alliance for Nuclear Accountability and is Co-Chair of the “Amplify: Generation of Change” network for nuclear abolition.

THE RISK OF NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE UNDER TRUMP

In Nuclear Guardianship, Nuclear Policy, Peace, Politics, War on May 24, 2017 at 11:33 pm

By REBECCA FRIEDMAN LISSNER, War on the Rocks, May 23, 2017

Growing tension on the Korean Peninsula has returned the unimaginable terror of nuclear war to the American public consciousness. The danger is a global one: Nine states possess nearly 15,000 nuclear weapons and the detonation of even one of these weapons could cause humanitarian and economic catastrophe. Although the use of a nuclear weapon by a state or non-state actor is unlikely, it is not impossible, and the risk may be growing. Indeed, such a rare event can be evaluated in terms of a simple risk-assessment formula: probability multiplied by consequences.

Given the enormous consequences of nuclear use, even small fluctuations in probability warrant attention. Some variation will arise from changes in the international environment, such as technological advances that make nuclear command and control systems more or less vulnerable to cyber-attack, or fluctuation in the level of tension between nuclear-armed rivals like India and Pakistan. But as the world’s most powerful state, with its own vast nuclear arsenal as well as a record of leadership in nonproliferation and nuclear security efforts, the United States plays an important role in moderating —– or enhancing —– the likelihood of nuclear use.

President Donald Trump’s comments during the campaign and transition prompted widespread concern about his cavalier attitude toward, and lack of knowledge about, the world’s deadliest weapons. Since taking office, he has tempered his rhetoric somewhat —– but more than 100 days into the Trump administration, there are early warning signs indicating the president’s policies could increase the risk of nuclear catastrophe.

Setting aside accidental launch or detonation, the most likely scenarios for the intentional or miscalculated use of a nuclear weapon are nuclear detonation by a state during crisis or wartime, and nuclear use by a non-state actor, such as a terrorist group. While this president is nothing if not unpredictable, it is both important and possible to sketch out how such a nuclear use might play out. The five risks described below are meant as a starting point for that discussion.

Risk #1: Nuclear First-Use by the United States

First, the president has the sole authority to launch nuclear weapons through the “nuclear triad” of land, sea, and air-launched systems. The horrific consequences, fear of retaliation, and extraordinary capabilities of U.S. conventional forces militate against nuclear use in all but the most extreme circumstances. Nonetheless, Trump’s impulsive temperament, obsession with projecting strength, and aversion to normative constraints may make him more prone to nuclear use than other recent presidents. Beyond these already-perceptible presidential proclivities, the Nuclear Posture Review —– which recently began under Pentagon leadership —– will elucidate the administration’s declaratory nuclear doctrine, providing the first concrete indication of scenarios in which the Trump administration would consider nuclear use.

Risk #2: Inadvertent Nuclear Escalation

Second, the Trump administration’s penchant for sending mixed signals increases the risk of misperception in the event of a crisis or war involving another nuclear state. Trump is famously mercurial, abruptly changing positions on issues ranging from NATO’s obsolescence to the desirability of nuclear proliferation. Rather than allowing the White House communications staff to clarify his positions, Trump often contradicts them. In December, for example, when aides sought to soften Trump’s call for the United States to “strengthen and expand” its nuclear arsenal, Trump went on the record a second time to threaten an arms race. Moreover, senior national security aides frequently stake out divergent policy positions – with the president’s apparent encouragement — as exhibited by the slew of incompatible explanations for Trump’s April decision to launch cruise missiles into Syria. The result is confusion surrounding whose statements represent administration policy —– a whiplash effect most recently on display in the back-and-forth on North Korea. Though the president seems to believe unpredictability creates bargaining leverage, it also prevents the administration from credibly telegraphing its intentions. This dynamic makes diplomacy difficult and privileges potentially escalatory military displays to demonstrate seriousness. If a crisis were to reach boiling point, the Trump administration would struggle to turn down the heat by credibly signaling restraint or limited aims. Moreover, amidst rising tensions, a weaker adversary would have little choice but to engage in worst-case-scenario planning, and a threatening tweet impulsively dispatched by the president could provoke a foreign leader to gamble on a first strike rather than risk U.S. preemption. Beyond contingencies that directly implicate the United States, Trump’s slippery reputation could also hinder his ability to arbitrate international disputes involving nuclear powers —– for example, if war were to break out between India and Pakistan.

Risk #3: A Lower Global Nuclear Threshold

Third, Trump has tempered his most incendiary campaign rhetoric on the subject of nuclear weapons —– but serious consequences would accompany a return to positions that promote nuclear proliferation and lower the normative threshold for nuclear use. Encouraging U.S. allies and partners like South Korea, Japan, and Saudi Arabia to go nuclear —– whether explicitly or by stoking fears of abandonment —– could spark atomic arms races in already-unstable regions. In addition, the administration’s recent extension of sanction waivers suggests its intent to abide by the terms of the Iran nuclear deal —– but a presidential decision to abrogate the “worst deal ever,” whether through outright withdrawal or accumulated acts of subtle sabotage, would likely spark an acute crisis. Proliferation risks would be further compounded by threats to use nuclear weapons first in unnecessary contingencies, such as against the self-proclaimed Islamic State, eroding the non-use norm that has contributed to nuclear restraint since 1945.

How might the Trump administration’s policies affect the likelihood of nuclear use by non-state actors? Terrorist groups are liable to use whatever lethal material they can get their hands on —– as demonstrated by the Islamic State’s employment of rudimentary chemical weapons in Iraq and Syria —– so the critical limiting factors are access to nuclear weapons, material, and expertise, and the ability to move it across international borders. Two additional factors will impact the U.S. government’s ability, in concert with international partners, to thwart such threats.

Risk #4: Diminished Domestic Capacity to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism

The United States’ capacity to counter nuclear terrorism will depend on the Trump administration’s resource decisions. Within the U.S. government, responsibility for the prevention of WMD terrorism is spread across numerous agencies with interlocking functions: From Department of Energy labs developing nuclear detection technology, to the Department of Homeland Security conducting radiological monitoring at U.S. ports, to intelligence and law enforcement agencies tracking threats, to the State Department coordinating with other countries to limit the spread of nuclear weapons globally, to Department of Defense training special operations forces to render safe nuclear weapons or material. Sustaining such capacity requires personnel and funding. The administration’s slow pace of political appointments creates risk by hobbling agency leadership, hindering inter-agency collaboration at the senior level, and creating a vacuum when it comes to defining affirmative policy priorities. The extent to which the Trump administration seeks funding for nuclear security-related programs in their proposed fiscal year 2018 budget —– expected to be released on May 23 —– will indicate the level of priority the administration assigns to mitigating WMD terrorism risk. (The Trump administration’s budget blueprint does not specifically address this issue.)

Risk #5: Weakened International Nuclear Security Cooperation

Finally, a withdrawal from international nonproliferation and nuclear material security cooperation could increase the risk of nuclear use by a non-state actor. If the Trump administration follows through on its avowed skepticism of multilateral institutions —– most notably the U.N. system —– critical cooperative mechanisms could be placed in jeopardy. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for example, is a U.N. agency that advances best practices in safeguarding nuclear material around the world. It maintains a global database for tracking lost or stolen nuclear materials, among other vital functions. The IAEA relies on U.S. contributions for roughly a quarter of its budget and withholding those funds would severely hinder its effectiveness. Similarly, an administration disdainful of U.N. bodies is unlikely to break the diplomatic logjam over restrictions on the production of nuclear material through the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, and may not insist upon stringent IAEA safeguards as a precondition for future agreements on civil nuclear cooperation. Beyond formal institutions, the Obama administration initiated a Nuclear Security Summit process, which convened global leaders to take concrete steps toward reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism. Whether the Trump administration maintains this focus and pushes for implementation of commitments made at past summits will further impact risk going forward.

Nuclear detonation, whether by a state or non-state actor, remains an extremely remote possibility, and the risk of such a rare event is difficult to quantify. Nonetheless, the catastrophic consequences of nuclear use demand attention —– not only from the White House, but also from Congress and the American people. Fortunately, the Trump administration is still in its early days and has ample opportunity for progress. “I hate nuclear more than any,” the president said during the 2016 campaign when asked about nuclear weapons. Action to address the five risks described above —– as part of a comprehensive nonproliferation and nuclear security agenda —– will signal the seriousness of the administration’s effort to reduce nuclear dangers.

Dr. Rebecca Friedman Lissner is a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Previously, she served as a Special Advisor to the Deputy Secretary of Energy.

United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination

In Environment, Human rights, Justice, Nuclear abolition, Nuclear Guardianship, Nuclear Policy, Peace on May 23, 2017 at 7:12 am

 

New York, 27-31 March 2017 and 15 June-7 July 2017

22 May 2017 Original: English

Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Submitted by the President of the Conference

The States Parties to this Convention,

Deeply concerned about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would result from any use of nuclear weapons and the consequent need to make every effort to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used again under any circumstances,

Cognizant that the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons transcend national borders, pose grave implications for human survival, the environment, socioeconomic development, the global economy, food security and for the health of future generations, and of the disproportionate impact of ionizing radiation on maternal health and on girls,

Mindful of the suffering of the victims of the use of nuclear weapons (Hibakusha) as well as of those affected by the testing of nuclear weapons,

Basing themselves on the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, in particular the principle that the right of parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited and the rule that care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, long term and severe damage, including a prohibition of the use of methods or means of warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural environment and thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the population,

Declaring that any use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law,

Reaffirming that in cases not covered by this convention, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience,

Determined to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

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Bearing in mind that the prohibition of nuclear weapons would be an important contribution towards comprehensive nuclear disarmament,

Stressing the urgent need to achieve further effective measures of nuclear disarmament in order to facilitate the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery,

Determined to act towards that end,
Determined also to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general

and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Affirming that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control,

Reaffirming the crucial importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, the vital importance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as a core element of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, and the contribution of the treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones toward strengthening the nuclear non- proliferation regime and to realizing the objective of nuclear disarmament,

Stressing the role of public conscience in the furthering of the principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for the total elimination of nuclear weapons and recognizing the efforts to that end undertaken by the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, numerous non-governmental organizations and the Hibakusha,

Have agreed as follows: Article 1

General obligations

1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to:

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

(b) Transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly;

(c) Receive the transfer or control over nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices directly, or indirectly;

(d) Use nuclear weapons;
(e) Carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion;

(f) Assist, encourage, or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention;

(g) Seek or receive any assistance, in any way, from anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.

2. Each State Party undertakes to prohibit and prevent in its territory or at any place under its jurisdiction or control:

(a) Any stationing, installation or deployment of any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

(b) Any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.

Article 2 Declarations

1. Each State Party shall submit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, not later than 30 days after this Convention enters into force for it a declaration in which it shall declare whether it has manufactured, possessed or otherwise acquired nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices after 5 December 2001.

2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such declarations received to the States Parties.

Article 3 Safeguards

Each State Party undertakes to accept safeguards, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as provided in the Annex to this Convention.

Article 4
Measures for States that have eliminated their nuclear weapons

1. Each State Party that has manufactured, possessed or otherwise acquired nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices after 5 December 2001, and eliminated all such weapons or explosive devices prior to the entry into force of the Convention for it, undertakes to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency for the purpose of verification of the completeness of its inventory of nuclear material and nuclear installations.

2. Unless otherwise agreed by the States Parties, arrangements necessary for the verification required by this Article shall be concluded in an agreement between the State Party and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such an agreement shall commence within 180 days of the submission of the declaration provided for in Article 2. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of the initiation of negotiations.

3. For the purpose of performing the verification required by this Article, the International Atomic Energy Agency shall be provided with full access to any location or facility associated with a nuclear weapon programme and shall have the right to request access on a case-by-case basis to other locations or facilities that the Agency may wish to visit.

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Article 5
Measures for situations not covered by Article 4

Proposals for further effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament, including provisions for the verified and irreversible elimination of any remaining nuclear weapon programmes under strict and effective international control, which may take the form of additional protocols to this Convention, may be considered at the Meetings of States Parties or Review Conferences. All States represented at the meeting or review conference may participate fully in such consideration. The meeting or review conference may agree upon additional protocols which shall be adopted and annexed to the Convention in accordance with its provisions.

Article 6 Assistance

1. Each State Party in a position to do so shall with respect to individuals affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons in areas under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with applicable international humanitarian and human rights law, adequately provide age- and gender-sensitive assistance, including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as provide for their social and economic inclusion.

2. Each State Party with respect to areas under its jurisdiction or control contaminated as a result of activities related to the testing or use of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, shall have the right to request and to receive assistance toward the environmental remediation of areas so contaminated.

3. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organizations or institutions, non-governmental organizations or institutions, or on a bilateral basis.

Article 7
National implementation

1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, adopt the necessary measures to implement its obligations under this Convention.

2. Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.

Article 8
International cooperation

1. Each State Party shall cooperate with other States Parties to facilitate the implementation of the obligations of this Convention.

2. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each State Party has the right to seek and receive assistance.

Article 9
Meeting of States Parties

1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider and, where necessary, take decisions in respect of any matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Convention and on the further elaboration of effective measures for nuclear disarmament, including:

(a) The operation and status of this Convention;

(b) Reports by States Parties on the implementation of their obligations under this Convention;

(c) Matters arising from the declarations submitted under Article 2 of this Convention;

(d) Proposals for effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament, including provisions for the verified and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapon programmes, including additional protocols to this Convention.

2. The first Meeting of States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations within one year of the entry into force of this Convention. Further Meetings of States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on a biennial basis, unless otherwise agreed by the States Parties.

3. After a period of five years following the entry into force of this Convention, the Meetings of States Parties may decide to convene a conference to review the operation of this Convention with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention, including the provisions concerning negotiations on effective measures for nuclear disarmament, are being realized.

4. States not party to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend the Meetings of States Parties and the Review Conferences as observers.

Article 10 Costs

1. The costs of the Meetings of the States Parties and the Review Conferences shall be borne by the States Parties and States not parties to this Convention participating therein, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations under Article 2 of this Convention shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.Article 11 Amendments

1. At the Meetings of States Parties or Review Conferences consideration may be given to any proposal for amendments of this Convention. The meeting or review conference may agree upon amendments which shall be adopted by a majority of two- thirds of the States Parties present and voting at the meeting or review conference.

2. The amendment shall enter into force for each State Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of the States Parties. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other State Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

Article 12
Settlement of disputes

1. When a dispute arises between two or more States Parties relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention, the parties concerned shall consult together with a view to the expeditious settlement of the dispute by negotiation or by other peaceful means of the parties’ choice, including recourse to the Meetings of States Parties and, by mutual consent, referral to the International Court of Justice in conformity with the Statute of the Court.

2. The Meeting of States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the States Parties concerned to start the settlement procedure of their choice and recommending a time limit for any agreed procedure.

Article 13 Universality

Each State Party shall encourage States not party to this Convention to ratify, accept, approve or accede to this Convention, with the goal of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention.

Article 14 Signature

This Convention shall be open for signature to all States before its entry into force.

Article 15 Ratification

This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States.

Article 16 Entry into force

1. This Convention shall enter into force 90 days after the fortieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited.

2. For any State that deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the fortieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force 90 days after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

Article 17 Reservations

The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations.

Article 18 Duration

1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each State Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Convention if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Convention, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Convention and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect three months after the receipt of the instrument of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that three- month period, the withdrawing State Party is engaged in the situations referred to in Article 2 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims, including any situation described in paragraph 4 of Article 1 of Additional Protocol I to these Conventions, the Party shall continue to be bound by the obligations of this Convention and of any annexed Protocols until the end of the armed conflict or occupation.

Article 19
Relations with other agreements

This Convention does not affect the rights and obligations of the States Parties under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Article 20 Depositary

The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Convention.

Article 21 Authentic texts

The Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of this Convention shall be equally authentic.

A predictable nuclear accident at Hanford

In Environment, Nuclear Guardianship, Nuclear Policy on May 18, 2017 at 7:56 am

By Hugh Gusterson is a professor of anthropology and international affairs at George Washington University. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists online

Last week’s accident at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation should have come as no surprise.

On May 9, workers discovered a 20-foot-diameter hole where the roof had collapsed on a makeshift nuclear waste site: a tunnel, sealed in 1965, encasing old railroad cars and equipment contaminated with radiation through years of plutonium processing. Potential radiation levels were high enough that some workers were told to shelter in place while others donned respirators and protective suits as they repaired the hole.

The Hanford complex, which dates back to 1943, produced the plutonium for the atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki. Half the size of Rhode Island, it is often described as the most contaminated place in the United States. Until its last reactor closed in 1987, it churned out plutonium for the roughly 70,000 nuclear weapons the United States built during the Cold War. As the historian Kate Brown documents in her book Plutopia, which explores the uncanny similarities between Hanford and its Soviet counterpart Ozersk, Hanford has been a slow-motion environmental disaster since its opening, constantly excreting radioactive contaminants into the air and water. More dangerous than the tunnels are the giant tanks of liquid nuclear waste: 177 of them containing 56 million gallons of radioactive soup whose composition is only approximately known. The contents of some have to be stirred periodically to prevent the formation of hydrogen bubbles that would cause the tanks to explode. One million gallons of this witches’ brew have already leaked into the groundwater from tanks that were built to last only 20 years. The US government projects that it will cost more than $107 billion to clean up the site, with remediation finished by 2060. Few knowledgeable people put much credence in either number.

It would be nice to say that Hanford is a unique canker on the US nuclear landscape, but it is not. It may be the most contaminated, but it is far from alone. At the Rocky Flats facility outside Denver, where workers fashioned Hanford’s plutonium into cores (or “pits”) for nuclear weapons, there were major fires in 1957 and 1969; each sent plutonium-laced plumes of smoke over nearby communities. Enough plutonium dust gathered in the facility’s ductwork that some worried about a spontaneous criticality event—that is, an accidental and uncontrolled nuclear chain reaction. Eventually President George H.W. Bush closed Rocky Flats in 1992 after an FBI investigation found that the facility was secretly (and illegally) burning nuclear waste in the middle of the night.

At Ohio’s Fernald plant, which processed uranium for the weapons complex, operators dumped radioactive waste into makeshift pits where it contaminated local groundwater, and blew uranium dust particles out of the smokestacks when the filters failed, as they did with some regularity. Similar stories could be told for the nuclear weapons facilities at Savannah River in North Carolina and Oak Ridge in Tennessee, which hushed up criticality accidents while contaminating nearby air and water.

There are three reasons these Cold War nuclear facilities turned into such environmental catastrophes. First, the Cold War American state, fixated on winning the arms race, put a premium on beating the Soviets at all costs. Producing uranium, plutonium, and weapons components was a higher priority than protecting the health of nearby residents or the workers at the plants, a disproportionate number of whom died of cancer. Ironically, since 1945, American nuclear weapons, intended to keep the country safe, have mainly killed Americans.

A second factor was state secrecy. As leading Cold War public intellectuals such as Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Edward Shils argued, abuse thrives in the dark, and Cold War secrecy provided much cover of darkness to places like Hanford. For decades, government officials and the contractors that ran the plants were able to deflect civilian regulators, nosy journalists, local citizens, even congressmen, by hiding behind the skirts of national security. Officials defined vital nuclear secrets expansively, to include not just the design and deployment details of weapons, but also the secret harms inflicted on Americans through their production. Anyone who revealed the extent of contamination risked losing his clearance or being incarcerated. The harms concealed at production facilities were mostly caused by accidents and bureaucratically ingrained negligence, but they were sometimes deliberate—as in the now infamous 1949 “Green Run,” when Hanford deliberately released a substantial invisible cloud of radioactive iodine and xenon to see how it would disperse.

Finally, we should not underestimate how novel and complex nuclear technology was in the early decades of the Cold War. Physicists, engineers, and technicians were still learning how the technology worked, how esoteric radioactive materials behaved in a range of conditions, and how toxic waste products were absorbed into the environment. As in any endeavor, you learn by making mistakes. Unfortunately, those mistakes left a legacy of contaminated Cold War production sites around the country that are beginning to look like a permanent archipelago of national sacrifice zones. “Will Hanford ever be cleaned up?” was the title of a 2013 Seattle Times article noting how little progress had been made after spending $36 billion on cleaning the site.

If the pathology of the Cold War was secrecy and an atmosphere of emergency, we have the opposite pathology now. Department of Energy websites catalogue the contamination in great detail—after all, the more contaminated the site, the more money Congress should provide to clean it—and official timelines for cleanup stretch interminably beyond the lifetimes of many living Americans. In a perverse way, radioactive contamination has gone from a shameful secret to be concealed to an asset to be milked. The cleanup campaign is becoming like the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan, America’s longest war. It takes place on the periphery of American public vision; it greatly enriches contractors; and there is always light at the end of the tunnel, but the only way we get near the light is when the tunnel collapses.

Harry S. Truman’s grandson speaks out against nuclear weapons

In Nuclear Guardianship, Nuclear Policy, Peace, Politics, War on May 16, 2017 at 10:29 pm

By Christopher Woolf, PRI’s The World, May 15, 2017

Harry S. Truman was perhaps one of the most influential presidents of the 20th century. He oversaw the end of World War I and rose to the challenge of the Cold War. He was crucial to the creation of international organizations like the United Nations and NATO.
But for many people, Truman is remembered for one thing: his decision to drop nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan, in August 1945.

His eldest grandson, Clifton Truman Daniel, is now an advocate against nuclear weapons.

He says his grandfather was consistent when it came to explaining the decision to use the bomb. “He made the decision [in order] to shorten the war, and save American lives, primarily, as well as Japanese lives had the war gone on, had there been a full-scale invasion.”

“The scholarship on that goes back and forth,” cautions Daniel. “But grandpa, having made the decision, nonetheless felt horrible about the destruction, about the loss of life.”

Daniel recounts the story of a US military photographer, Joe O’Donnell, who documented the aftermath of the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. O’Donnell had an opportunity to meet Truman alone in 1950. According to Daniel, “O’Donnell just took a chance and asked my grandfather, ‘Did you ever have any regrets using those weapons?’ and my grandfather said ‘Hell yes.’ He didn’t want to have to do that.”

Truman never spoke with Daniel about the atomic bombings. “I learned about them like everybody else, in history class and from my books. And the books didn’t tell me much — you get casualty figures but it doesn’t really tell you what happened on the ground.”

Daniel’s big insight into the horrors of nuclear war didn’t come until he was in his 40s, when his son was 10. “He was in school here in Chicago, in fifth grade,” says Daniel, “and he came home with a book called ‘Sadako and the Thousand Paper Cranes.’ A fictionalized account of a true story.”

The true story belonged to Sadako Sasaki, who developed leukemia ten years after being exposed to radiation at Hiroshima. “In an effort to save her own life, she followed a Japanese tradition that says if you fold 1,000 origami paper cranes, you are granted a wish, or long life or health,” Daniel says.

Sadako folded 1,300 cranes, but unfortunately it did not save her life.

“That was the first human story I had ever seen of Hiroshima or Nagasaki,” says Daniel. A Japanese reporter picked up on the fact that Daniel had read it, and out of blue he got a call from Sadako Sasaki’s brother, Masahiro, himself a survivor.

They finally met, in New York, at the 9/11 Tribute Center. “Masahiro and his son Yuji were donating one of Sadako’s original cranes as a gesture of healing,” explains Daniel.

“At the end of our meeting, Yuji Sasaki took out a small plastic box and dropped a tiny paper crane into my palm and said, ‘That’s the last one Sadako folded before she died. Would you come to the ceremonies in Hiroshima and Nagasaki?’ And I said yes.”

Daniel took his family and met with more than two dozen survivors.

“It’s hard to explain. It’s hard to describe,” Daniel says when asked to explain how that felt, particularly as the grandson of the man who ordered the attacks.

“It’s heart-wrenching. It’s hard. It’s horrible to hear these stories,” he says. “But as hard as it is for the listener, it’s harder still for the survivor who relives that day over and over and over again, solely in an effort to let the listener know what it was like, so that we don’t do it again.”

Daniel says he did not feel any residual guilt, but he did feel responsibility. “Not responsibility for the bombings, but responsibility to do what I could to help ensure that it doesn’t happen again.”

“All [that] the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki asked me, were to please help them tell their stories,” says Daniel. “So I’ve tried to do that.”

Nuclear Weapons: Who Pays, Who Profits?

In Cost, Democracy, Nuclear Guardianship, Nuclear Policy, Peace, Politics, War on May 15, 2017 at 3:02 am

Introduction: Trump and Nuclear Weapons — Rhetoric Versus Reality
In an interview with Reuters conducted a month after he took office, Donald Trump asserted that the U.S. had “fallen behind on nuclear capability” and that he wanted the United States to be at the “top of the pack” on nuclear weapons once again.
As usual, Trump had not done his homework before speaking out on a crucial, life-and-death question. The United States is already at the “top of the pack” in nuclear capacity, with nearly 6,800 nuclear warheads, including 4,000 in the active stockpile. That’s a huge number when you consider that independent experts have determined that 300 or so nuclear weapons are a sufficient number to deter any nation from attacking the United States with a nuclear weapon. We have thirteen times that in our active stockpile, and more than five times that amount deployed and ready to fire at any given moment.
So the United States is already at the “top of the pack” in nuclear weapons — so high, in fact, that our huge arsenal is more likely to spur a nuclear arms race than it is to protect us from a nuclear war.
In the same Reuters interview, Trump described the New START nuclear arms reduction treaty as “just another bad deal the country made,” comparing it to the multilateral agreement to curb Iran’s nuclear program, which Trump has repeatedly disparaged despite the fact that he has shown no indication that he knows what the agreement entails.
This knee-jerk opposition to any agreement that Trump himself has not negotiated is dangerously short-sighted. New START cuts deployed U.S. and Russian nuclear warheads by one-third, and it includes a detailed monitoring and inspections regime to make sure both sides keep their word.
The Iran nuclear deal has already resulted in a 98% reduction in Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium, the disabling of a plutonium factory that could have produced bomb-making materials, and a regime of regular international inspections.
Solid agreements like New START and the Iran nuclear deal take a great deal of time and effort to negotiate. Throwing them away on a whim would be the height of recklessness.
Trump’s Twisted Budget Priorities
The issue of whether to buy a whole new generation of nuclear warheads and nuclear delivery vehicles will be debated against the backdrop of the Trump administration’s fiscal year 2018 budget proposal, which calls for a $54 billion increase in Pentagon spending and comparable reductions in spending on diplomacy and domestic needs.
Even before Trump’s proposed increase, Pentagon spending is at historically high levels. At roughly $600 billion per year now, Pentagon and related spending is higher than the peak of the Reagan military buildup, and larger than the combined military budgets of the next eight largest spenders in the world combined, most of them U.S. allies. So the Pentagon may have problems, but a lack of funds isn’t one of them.
Trump’s proposed increase alone is a huge sum by global standards. At $54 billion, the Trump increase is almost as large as the entire military budget of France, and larger than the total military budgets of the United Kingdom, Germany, or Japan. And it’s only $12 billion less than Russia’s whole military budget.
The Trump increase is also a huge sum compared to the domestic programs that are on the chopping block to pay for the $54 billion in increased Pentagon funding. When Trump’s budget blueprint was first taking form, White House budget director Mick Mulvaney announced a “hit list” of eight programs or agencies that would be zeroed out in the fiscal year 2018 budget proposal. The list included the National Endowment for the Humanities; the National Endowment for the Arts; Legal Services; Americorps; the Corporation for Public Broadcasting; the U.S. Institute for Peace; and Planned Parenthood. Gutting all of these agencies and programs combined would save $3 billion per year — that’s one-half of one percent of the Pentagon’s annual budget, before the proposed Trump add-ons. The $3 billion for all of those programs is also less than one-eighth of the $25 billion the Pentagon wastes on bureaucratic overhead every year.
And of course the budget director’s hit list is just a small part of the larger assault on spending for diplomacy and domestic needs that is part of the Trump budget blueprint. The Environmental Protection Agency is slated for a 31% cut; the State Department budget is proposed to be cut by 29%; and support for humanitarian aid through the United Nations — mostly refugee and food assistance at a time of massive refugee flows and near famine in parts of Africa and the Middle East — could be cut by up to 50%.
Three block grant programs that provide services like heating aid to low income households, homeless housing and services, ands support for Meals on Wheels programs are scheduled to be eliminated altogether, at a cost of $8 billion. The $8 billion cost of those programs is less than the cost of one new ballistic missile firing submarine — and the Pentagon wants us to pay for twelve of them.
The Pentagon’s $1 Trillion Nuclear Buildup: What Are We Buying?
The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies has done a report on the “trillion dollar triad” — the plan to build a new generation of nuclear-armed bombers, submarines, and missiles, complete with new warheads to go with them, at a cost of roughly $1 trillion over three decades.
Here are the major components of that proposed $1 trillion nuclear weapons buildup:
— New nuclear warhead facilities, and new nuclear warheads, $350 billion, spent through the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA);
— 12 new ballistic missile submarines at over $8 billion each, or roughly $100 billion in total
— 100 B-21 bombers for up to $1 billion each, or $100 billion total
— Hundreds of new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), at a cost of up to $120 billion
— A new nuclear-armed cruise missile, at a cost of up to $20 billion for the whole program
Things could change — fewer systems could be bought, and the $1 trillion price tag could go down. Or, as usually happens, the original estimates could go up as a result of the cost overruns that are almost inevitable in any major weapons program.
Who Profits from Spending on Nuclear Weapons?
A handful of companies will be the main beneficiaries of the Pentagon’s nuclear weapons spending binge.
B-21 Bomber: Northrop Grumman is the prime contractor; the Pratt and Whitney division of United Technologies will build the engines; and BAE Systems, a global defense firm based primarily in the UK and the United States, is a major subcontractor.
Ballistic Missile Submarine: General Dynamics will be the prime contractor, with major assistance from Virginia-based Huntington Ingalls Shipbuilding.
ICBM and nuclear-armed cruise missile: Contracts have not been awarded yet for these systems, but bidders will include Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Boeing, and Raytheon.
Nuclear warheads: The biggest beneficiaries of spending on nuclear warheads are the contractors that run major facilities for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), including Honeywell, which runs the Sandia nuclear weapons engineering laboratory in New Mexico, and a consortium that includes the University of California and Becthel, which run the Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore nuclear weapons laboratories.
The best list of major nuclear weapons producers is maintained by Don’t Bank on the Bomb, a campaign that presses banks to withdraw support for companies involved in developing or producing nuclear weapons. Their web site profiles over two dozen major nuclear weapons supplying companies.
Opportunity Costs: What Can We Buy With $1 Trillion?
Not only is it unnecessary to embark on a three decade, $1 trillion effort to build a new generation of nuclear weapons, but it’s dangerous. As noted above, a tiny fraction of the existing U.S. stockpile is enough to dissuade any nation from attacking the United States with a nuclear weapon. Anything beyond that just encourages other countries to modernize and expand their own arsenals. And the more nuclear weapons there are the more likely one will be used. In fact, the only guaranteed protection against nuclear weapons is to get rid of them all. That’s a daunting challenge, but as a first step we have to stop building new nuclear weapons at a time when the United States and the other nuclear weapons states possess vast nuclear overkill.
The ultimate cost of the trillion dollar buildup is the risk it poses to the future of life on earth.
There are also huge opportunity costs associated with spending vast sums on nuclear weapons we don’t need. The Future of Life Institute has created an online tool that lets you choose alternative ways to spend that trillion dollars. I tried it, and I found out we could buy the following things instead of wasting a trillion dollars on a new generation of nuclear weapons:
— 100 Million School Lunches: $235 million
— 10,000 High School Science Teachers for one year: $553 million
— Salvage and Protect All Superfund Toxic Waste Sites for one year: $681 million
— Provide Federal Funding for Planned Parenthood for one year: $528 million
— Health Insurance for 1 Million Families for one year: $16.8 billion
— End Homelessness for one year: $20 billion
— Fix All Deficient Bridges in the U.S.: $71 billion
All of the above investments represent only about 10 percent of the $1 trillion the Pentagon wants to spend on nuclear weapons over the next three decades.
There is one option offered by the Future of Life Institute tool that would put a serious dent in the $1 trillion spending total:
— Burn a $1 Million Pile of Cash Every Hour for Thirty Years: $262 Billion
Burning piles of cash would be a waste of money, to be sure, but it would be a far better, and far safer, use of the funds than spending them on extending a nuclear arms race that puts us all at risk.
This article is adapted from a presentation made by William D. Hartung, the director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy, at a conference on “Reducing the Threat of Nuclear War” that was held at MIT on May 6th, 2017.

Why You Should Care About the Formation of the Nuclear Crisis Group

In Democracy, Nuclear Guardianship, Nuclear Policy, Peace, Politics on May 10, 2017 at 11:02 pm

In this column, Rachel Bronson, executive director and publisher of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, explores the formation of the Nuclear Crisis Group. May 9, 2017.

On Friday, an elite group of the world’s nuclear experts and advisers launched a Nuclear Crisis Group, to help manage the growing risk of nuclear conflict. The group includes leading diplomats with decades of experience, and retired military officers who were once responsible for launching nuclear weapons if given the order to do so. China, India, Pakistan, Russia, and the United States, all countries that have nuclear weapons, are represented. The group intends to create a “shadow security council,” or an expert group capable of providing advice to world leaders on nuclear matters.
The group is one of the better things to come out of a terrible spiral in nuclear security that we are currently witnessing. Their goal, to help reduce the “alarming rise of tensions involving nuclear-armed governments,” is worth our attention.
Over the past several years, nuclear security has gone from bad to worse. In 2015, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists moved the hands of the Doomsday Clock from five to three minutes to midnight to acknowledge the deteriorating situation. The Doomsday Clock is a 70-year-old symbol that helps communicate what a group of leading science and security experts think about how close or far away we are from destroying civilization. It has been as close to 2 minutes to midnight, and as far as 17 minutes to midnight. This past January, the Board of the Bulletin moved the clock 30 seconds closer to 2.5 minutes to midnight.
In moving the hands of the clock, the Bulletin noted that world leaders have grown cavalier about nuclear weapons and their language has become reckless. For example, around Christmas the Pakistani defense minister tweeted a nuclear threat at Israel in response to a fake news story. Shortly before taking office, President Trump tweeted that “the United States must greatly strengthen and expand its nuclear capability” without giving a convincing reason why.
Such loose talk mirrors other serious developments. Every nuclear state is investing significant national resources in upgrading their nuclear programs. The U.S. is on the cusp of investing a trillion dollars in its nuclear weapons over the next 30 years. In March, the Pentagon confirmed that Russia violated an important nuclear arms control agreement. And, as if on cue, the United States and North Korea are engaged today in a kind of nuclear brinkmanship that the world hasn’t seen since some of the worst days of the Cold War. The world seems to be on the cusp of a nuclear arms race that is spiraling downward.
The good news is that citizens are mobilizing to reverse this frightening situation.
Last Wednesday, a petition was delivered to Congress to block President Trump from being able to be the first to use nuclear weapons without congressional approval in a crisis. The petition had nearly a half-million signatures. And this June, a major women’s march to “ban the bomb” is being planned in New York City. In other words, the leaders’ group that met on Friday is backed by a newly engaged and motivated group of ordinary citizens.
Building on grass-roots support, the Nuclear Crisis Group could serve as a brake on nuclear escalation and be an early step in reversing the downward nuclear security spiral. Not only will they be able to offer expertise to inexperienced leaders who are dabbling in nuclear security, but they will be able to develop and endorse proposals that could make the world safer such as expanding the decision time that leaders have to respond to a nuclear threat, further protecting nuclear systems against cyber attacks and unintended escalations, reenergizing the appetite for arms control negotiations, and questioning global nuclear upgrade programs.
But it is important for all of us to keep the pressure on and to ask our local political representatives what they are doing to decrease nuclear tensions. We now have the beginnings of a movement that extends from Main Street straight into the halls of power. Let’s use it to advance peace and security.

Does Trump think America could win a nuclear war?

In Nuclear Guardianship, Nuclear Policy, Peace, Politics, War on May 5, 2017 at 10:19 pm

By David, Faris, The Week, May 3, 2017

In between another failed congressional push for TrumpCare and President Trump musing inanely about why the Civil War happened, there’s been lots of loose talk about North Korea. The president, who was only recently issuing menacing threats from his Twitter account, now says he is willing to be the first president to meet with his North Korean counterpart, Kim Jong Un, even as White House Chief of Staff Reince Priebus says he can’t see it happening. U.N. Ambassador Nikki Haley recently threatened a strike on the nuclear-armed dictatorship, while Secretary of State Rex Tillerson contradicted Vice President Pence by saying that the U.S. might sit down for multiparty negotiations.

The policy and rhetorical incoherence from the White House is sadly typical for a group of amateur leaders that can’t seem to do something as simple as call a meeting and agree on a set of talking points. Far from projecting strength or throwing adversaries off balance with some kind of Nixonian “madman theory” of foreign policy, the failure to get America’s key decision-makers on the same page only makes the administration look feckless and adrift — and makes it more likely that a misunderstanding could lead to an even more serious crisis.

But the more important questions are whether the president and his advisers have an end game, and how they view nuclear weapons in general. From the moment he took office, President Trump has seemed weirdly determined to get the 24 million people of metropolitan Seoul incinerated in a pointless war, and his team is reacting to every provocation from Pyongyang as if this is the first time North Korea has ever tested a missile or released an unhinged statement.
It is not clear what the Trump administration hopes to achieve with its recent escalation of tensions. There are only two things that would represent an improvement over the status quo on the Korean Peninsula (assuming that reunification is a nonstarter). One is a negotiated agreement that leads North Korea to surrender the nuclear weapons it has already built and rejoin the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) from which it withdrew in 2003, or to at least freeze its missile and weapons programs.

However, the U.S. is governed by people who don’t believe other countries can be trusted to adhere to international agreements and who keep threatening obliquely or overtly to blow apart the Iran deal. If Trump and his advisers are trying to get North Korea back to the table, they are also pursuing a gravely mistaken path by threatening the agreement with Iran. Not only would undermining the Iran deal convince the North Koreans that we can’t be trusted, it will also make North Korea’s neighbors less likely to cooperate in any sanctions effort that could squeeze Pyongyang hard enough to get them to change their behavior.

The second potential improvement on the Korean Peninsula would be if the odious regime of Kim Jong Un were replaced. Yet self-preservation is what drove Pyongyang to acquire nuclear weapons in the first place. The regime views its small nuclear deterrent as the only thing preventing the U.S. from leading an Iraq-style adventure straight to Pyongyang, and the aggressive and inconsistent messaging from Washington will do nothing to ease those concerns.

So what is the administration up to, exactly? One possibility might be that it doesn’t fear a nuclear exchange in the same way that most other U.S. presidents have since the dawn of the nuclear age.
The Cold War with the Soviet Union was governed by a nuclear strategy called MAD — Mutual Assured Destruction. Recognizing the awful nature of atomic bombs, MAD was designed to convince nuclear powers that any use of nuclear weapons would invite massive retaliation catastrophic enough to obliterate both societies. Many scholars argue credibly that the resulting “balance of terror” helped decrease the risk of warfare between the superpowers and prevented the outbreak of World War III. But even committed proponents of MAD were troubled by the prospect of killing hundreds of millions of Soviet civilians in an act of naked revenge. As Lawrence Freedman wrote in The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, the problem was that it “put the threat of unprecedented genocide at the center of American strategy.” In fact, it was deep moral discomfort with a blasé posture of mutual annihilation that led some thinkers to wonder whether a nuclear war could be fought without escalating to Armageddon.

The U.S. frequently made moves and decisions during the Cold War that suggested there was more to its posture than MAD. Military planners deployed all manner of “tactical” nuclear weapons designed to be used on the battlefield. Kennedy, Nixon, and Carter all developed variations on doctrines known loosely as “flexible response,” believing that policymakers should have more options in a nuclear conflict than simply murdering all of the hostages at once. To this day, the U.S. maintains in its nuclear posture the right to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons in a conflict, and you can assume that the idea is not to start a large-scale nuclear war that would kill everyone on Earth.

Howard Margolis and Jack Ruina coined the term Nuclear Utilization Theory in an influential 1979 article to describe these ideas, but during the heyday of the Cold War it was also called NUTS — Nuclear Utilization and Target Selection. Proponents believed that a nuclear war could be fought and won without escalating to a full-scale, civilization-obliterating thermonuclear exchange. In particular, they believed in the tactical utility of using small numbers of nuclear weapons in the event of a conventional war to gain and press advantages on the battlefield. NUTS proponents never had much luck convincing planners or the general public that nuclear weapons are just another gizmo in the great power toolbox.

How does this all fit into the North Korea crisis? During the campaign, Trump was credibly rumored to have asked a foreign policy adviser, during a conversation about nuclear weapons, “If we have them, why can’t we use them?” In January, he told Morning Joe co-host Mika Brzezinski, “Let it be an arms race.” His December tweet that “the United States must greatly strengthen and expand its nuclear capability until such time as the world comes to its senses regarding nukes” is precisely the opposite of the process called for by the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which requires states that possess nukes to work toward their elimination. And he recently approved the use of America’s most destructive non-nuclear bomb, the Massive Ordnance Air Blast, in Afghanistan.

In other words, it is not that hard to imagine Trump believing some half-baked, inchoate, Fox News version of NUTS and then acting on it. North Korea has a very small number of nuclear weapons — probably about 10 — and Trump may believe either that North Korea won’t use them, or that South Korean and American forces could survive an exchange and then either retaliate or launch a conventional invasion of the North. This is, of course, completely bananas and could easily lead to a wider nuclear exchange that will prevent all of us from seeing the second season of Stranger Things. NUTS was always a fringe movement because no one could really envision a plausible scenario where policymakers calmly de-escalate a situation after a nuke has gone off. Can Defense Secretary Mattis — who was firm during his confirmation hearings that nuclear weapons must never be used — convince his boss that NUTS is, well, nuts?

The question is far from academic. The threat of planetary obliteration that hung over all citizens during the Cold War has largely receded from memory. Hollywood thrillers about nuclear war, like Testament and Miracle Mile, have largely been replaced in the public imagination by films about terrorist atrocities and zombies. Yet the threat of accidental nuclear annihilation remains quite real. The Russians allegedly maintain a mysterious system called Perimeter, which many analysts believe is a “dead hand” set to launch nuclear missiles in the event of any nuclear detonation in the country. With several more powers joining the nuclear club since the end of the Cold War, including North Korea, India, and Pakistan, the aggregate risk of nuclear war — even if still quite small — is probably higher than it has been since the Cuban Missile Crisis.

The fact that the United States is now led by an erratic, ill-tempered novice makes the situation even more unstable. One of the genuinely terrifying things about Donald Trump is how little he appears to know about anything, and how he frequently discovers new facts about the world that would strike most people as self-evident. He’s like the imbecile son of a hereditary monarch who becomes king at age 13 when dad chokes to death on a tenderloin. He requires, at all times, a team of educated adults to tutor him on the the basics of diplomacy and history even as he makes momentous decisions about life and death. Mattis, National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster, and Vice President Pence are basically operating a regency for a president who is incapacitated by his own ignorance and stupidity.

This may all be bluster, and at the end of the day, war with North Korea remains unlikely. But one of these regents (and God bless them) needs to get our dude caught up on nuclear strategy, unless the few survivors of a nuclear exchange would like to hear him musing, post-apocalypse, about how nuclear weapons are so much deadlier than he thought before he accidentally became leader of the most powerful country in the world.

In Nuclear Guardianship, Nuclear Policy, Peace, Politics, War on May 5, 2017 at 5:02 am

Terrorism is fueling fears of unintended war between the two bitter enemies.

David Wood, Huffington Popst
WASHINGTON ― While President Donald Trump is focused on North Korea’s nuclear madman, a more alarming threat is rising in South Asia: an explosive mix of nuclear weapons, terrorism and hair-trigger war plans.

Pakistan, already a major nuclear weapons power with well over 100 warheads and the missiles to carry them, is racing to expand its arsenal of short-range tactical weapons meant as a deterrent against India, its larger, more powerful neighbor and blood enemy. India is thought to have around 100 nuclear warheads of its own. (North Korea is estimated to possess enough fissile material to make several warheads.)

But it’s not the numbers of weapons between India and Pakistan that most worry analysts and diplomats. It’s the instability of their nuclear stand-off and the possibility that an accident, a miscalculation or a terrorist attack could ignite a catastrophic nuclear war.

Bitter and distrustful, the two countries have fought four wars since 1947 and skirmished in numerous border clashes that continue to this day. Analysts now warn of a growing risk that another border clash could swiftly escalate into a nuclear crisis.

Just as likely, they say, a terrorist group such as the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba could launch an assault inside India, as it did in the Mumbai attacks of 2008. That might prompt the powerful Indian army to respond by driving deep into Pakistan, an assault that the latter nation could halt only by using its nuclear weapons. India considered such an attack after 174 people were killed in Mumbai eight years ago. In that instance, U.S. officials reportedly were able to talk the Indian military out of such reprisals.

Pakistan displays its nuclear-capable NASR missile battery during a military parade in Islamabad on March 23, 2017.
In other all-too-possible scenarios, Pakistani extremists could attempt to obtain a nuclear weapon for themselves. Radicalized members of the Pakistani armed forces might provide the terrorists with insider help.

Past terrorist attacks on Pakistani military bases have already been staged with insider help. In 2011, extremists fought their way into the heavily guarded Mehran naval air base, blowing up aircraft and holding off commandos for 16 hours. In 2014, they tried to hijack a Pakistani warship.

Strategists also suggest that Pakistani jihadists might stage a terrorist attack in India with the intention of provoking a crisis between the two countries. When Pakistan began removing its weapons from secure storage to stage them for a possible launch, the terrorists would pounce and steal one or more warheads.

“The whole South Asian subcontinent is becoming more and more of a nuclear powder keg,” said Matthew Bunn, a nuclear weapons analyst at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. “You can easily imagine an inadvertent process of escalation to an all-out nuclear war that neither wanted, provoked by terrorism.”

Scott Sagan, senior political scientist at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, puts the risk of an India-Pakistan nuclear clash at a higher threat level than the current U.S. confrontation with North Korea. Dealing with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is dicey and uncertain, but with Pakistan, he said, “the U.S. influence is far more limited.”

An all-out nuclear war that set Indian and Pakistani cities burning would produce enough smoke and particulate debris in the upper atmosphere to cause global temperatures and precipitation to plummet. Corn and soybean yields in the U.S. Midwest and elsewhere would be cut by 20 percent and there would be massive global food shortages for years, according to some climate models.

The pressure in the region to escalate to the use of nuclear weapons has been intensified by India’s adoption of “Cold Start,” a military strategy that calls for lightning strikes with tank columns and artillery deep into Pakistani territory at the start of a conflict. The shift in strategy came after Indian forces based in the country’s interior were unable to quickly punish Pakistan after Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists overran the Indian parliament in late 2001. Subsequently, India moved quick-strike battle groups close to the border with Pakistan, where they remain on alert.

In response, Pakistan has deployed short-range Nasr missiles, which can carry nuclear warheads and hit targets about 35 miles away, into its own border region. There are some reports that the country is developing nuclear artillery shells and land mines as well. If war were to break out, Pakistan would have to use these weapons quickly, before their locations were overrun by Indian troops.

If any optimism is to be found in this war scenario, it is that by aiming its nuclear weapons at Indian troops, rather than civilian population centers, Pakistan would give India “little justification for a disproportionate nuclear strike on Pakistan’s strategic centers,” according to Indian analyst Sajid Farid Shapoo.

Experts are especially worried that terrorists will play on the historic enmity between India and Pakistan to trigger an unintended nuclear exchange.

“The combination of tactical nuclear weapons and Cold Start doctrine provides an opportunity for terrorist elements to initiate a nuclear war,” writes Shahzeb Ali Rathore, an analyst at the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research in Singapore.

Parts of the Pakistani military and intelligence services are closely tied to various militant groups and have sympathizers within them. Matthew Bunn, a nuclear weapons analyst at Harvard
The tricky balance for Pakistan is to secure its nuclear weapons against theft or misuse, but still have them ready for launching in a crisis. Although the security arrangements are highly secret, Pakistan is believed to store its nuclear warheads disassembled and at a distance from the airfields and missile sites where they would be prepared for use.

Bunn recently spoke with officers of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division, which is responsible for securing the nation’s nuclear arsenal. He said the risk that terrorists could hijack a warhead is serious.

“We know that various parts of the Pakistani military and intelligence services are closely tied to various militant groups and have sympathizers within them,” Bunn told HuffPost. Members of the military and security forces can be radicalized “in a matter of months,” he said. “Pakistanis say that won’t happen to them. But it strikes me as something to worry about, given the repeated incidents of insider threats at other Pakistani military organizations.”

Last year in Washington, Pakistan officials sought to reassure an international gathering of nuclear security officials that they have strengthened security measures ― including, according to a statement, “deploying radiation detection equipment at several entry and exit points to deter, detect and prevent illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials.” The Pakistan Embassy in Washington did not respond to requests for comment for this story.

The United States may have secretly provided Pakistan some technical advice on securing nuclear weapons in the past, but that offers only limited comfort. “Whatever assistance we’ve given them, it’s impossible to know how well they’ve implemented it,” said Sagan.

Bottom line: “Pakistan knows it has an internal terrorist problem and a personnel reliability problem as well,” Sagan said. The risk of terrorists obtaining a Pakistani nuclear weapon “is a huge problem, and it’s one that can be mitigated somewhat but it can’t be eliminated.”

Growing Nuclear Dangers: What Would Dr. King Say?

In Nuclear Guardianship, Nuclear Policy, Peace, Politics, War on May 4, 2017 at 10:06 pm

Thursday, April 20, 2017
By Jacqueline Cabasso, Speakout | Op-Ed

April 4 was the 50th anniversary of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s remarkably prescient speech, “Beyond Vietnam: A Time to Break Silence,” in which he laid bare the relationship between US wars abroad and the racism and poverty being challenged by the civil rights movement at home. “I knew that I could never again raise my voice against the violence of the oppressed in the ghettos without having first spoken clearly to the greatest purveyor of violence in the world today — my own government.” Tragically, Dr. King was assassinated exactly one year later.

In that speech, he also said:

I am convinced that if we are to get on the right side of the world revolution, we as a nation must undergo a radical revolution of values. We must rapidly begin the shift from a ‘thing-oriented’ society to a ‘person-oriented’ society. When machines and computers, profit motives and property rights are considered more important than people, the giant triplets of racism, materialism, and militarism are incapable of being conquered.
King also said, “A nation that continues year after year to spend more money on military defense than on programs of social uplift is approaching spiritual death.”

In just over a week, we’ve experienced two shocking US military strikes and an alarming increase in tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

Two days after major newspapers reported that a chemical attack had occurred in a village in Syria, killing and injuring many civilians, the US launched 59 cruise missiles at a Syrian airbase — its first direct military attack against the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. This despite the fact that there had been no investigation by any international agency that might confirm that a chemical weapons attack had occurred or who was responsible — and in violation of international law. This bombing was unquestioningly welcomed by most of the mainstream media and Democratic leadership in Congress. Bombing, apparently, is considered “presidential.”

On April 13, seemingly out of the blue, the US dropped a 22,000-pound bomb on an ISIS/Daesh cave complex in Afghanistan. This Massive Ordnance Air Blast bomb, or MOAB — misogynistically called the “mother of all bombs” was the largest non-nuclear bomb ever used by the United States on the battlefield. What signal was being sent? And to whom?

The next day, the National Nuclear Security Administration announced the successful field test of a B61-12 nuclear gravity bomb at the Nevada Test Site.

Meanwhile, amidst speculation about a potentially imminent nuclear weapons test by North Korea, tensions on the Korean Peninsula have risen to the highest level in decades, as US and North Korean officials posit threats and counter-threats of preemptive military strikes. Even hawkish former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has warned, “We have the potential for a nuclear war that would take millions of lives. So I think we have to exercise some care here.”

This isn’t the only nuclear flashpoint. Tensions between the United States/NATO and Russia have risen to levels not seen since the Cold War, with the two nuclear giants confronting each other in Ukraine, Eastern Europe and Syria, and an accelerated tempo of military exercises and wargames, both conventional and nuclear, on both sides.

At the moment, Donald Trump has a warm and fuzzy view of Chinese President Xi Jinping, but at the same time, the US is facing off against China in seas where other Asian nations are contesting Chinese territorial claims. And India and Pakistan remain locked in a nuclear arms race amid mounting diplomatic tensions.

While our ability to discern what’s actually going on is shrouded in an unprecedented web of intrigue and a blizzard of propaganda, there can be no doubt that the dangers of wars among nuclear-armed states are growing.

But I don’t want to talk about Donald Trump. I want to talk about continuity in US nuclear weapons and national security policies. Donald Trump’s ability to launch massive military strikes on a whim while threatening global annihilation, within the first 100 days of his presidency, is only possible because of the vast military-industrial complex he inherited.

On December 22, 2016, President-elect Donald Trump ominously tweeted: “The United States must greatly strengthen and expand its nuclear capability until such time as the world comes to its senses regarding nukes.” In a February 2017 interview, President Trump said: “It would be wonderful, a dream would be that no country would have nukes, but if countries are going to have nukes, we’re going to be at the top of the pack.”

Trump’s initial budget request signals his administration’s intention to prioritize reliance on the nuclear threat. While it’s only a small portion of his proposed $54 billion increase in military spending, the $1.4 billion increase for the National Nuclear Security Administration, which oversees nuclear weapons research and development, is a proportionally higher increase at 11 percent than the 8 percent increase the Pentagon would get.

In an increasingly volatile world, this is consistent with US national security policy in the post-World War II and post-Cold War eras, despite dramatically changed geopolitical conditions.

During the 1980s, fear of nuclear war was by far the most visible issue of concern to the American public. In the early ’80s thousands of people rallied and were arrested in nonviolent acts of anti-nuclear protest. Yet following the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons — especially US nuclear weapons — fell off the public’s radar screen.

Meanwhile, deeply embedded in the military-industrial complex, Pentagon planners and scientists at the nuclear weapons labs conjured up new justifications to sustain the nuclear weapons enterprise. Following the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union, in 1991 Colin Powell, then-chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, declared:

You’ve got to step aside from the context we’ve been using for the past 40 years, that you base [military planning] against a specific threat. We no longer have the luxury of having a threat to plan for. What we plan for is that we’re a superpower. We are the major player on the world stage with responsibilities … [and] interests around the world.
In 1997, nearly 10 years after the Cold War ended, President Bill Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive-60, reaffirming the threatened first use of nuclear weapons as the “cornerstone” of US national security, and contemplating an expanded role for nuclear weapons to “deter” not only nuclear but chemical and biological weapons. The Bush doctrine of “preventive” war was a continuation and expansion of programs and policies carried out by every US administration, Republican or Democrat, since 1945, when President Harry Truman, a Democrat, oversaw the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

His soaring rhetoric notwithstanding, President Obama left office with the United States poised to spend $1 trillion over the next 30 years to maintain and modernize its nuclear bombs and warheads, the submarines, missiles and bombers to deliver them, and the infrastructure to sustain the nuclear enterprise indefinitely.

Over the past couple of years, the US has conducted a series of drop tests of the newly modified B61-12 gravity bomb at the Tonopah test range in Nevada. The Russian foreign minister has declared these tests “provocative.” The B61-12 has a “selectable” yield, making it up to four times more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb. It has a new tail kit which provides precision guidance. This capability, along with the selectable yield, raises concerns that it could be considered more militarily usable. Each new bomb will cost more than twice its weight in solid gold. And of the 480 B61s slated to become B61-12s, approximately 180 will be deployed at six NATO bases in Europe.

More than a quarter of a century since the end of the Cold War, nearly 15,000 nuclear weapons, most an order of magnitude more powerful than the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs, more than 90 percent held by the US and Russia, continue to pose an intolerable threat to humanity and the biosphere. Recent studies show that a nuclear war involving 100 Hiroshima-size atomic bombs dropped on cities could produce climate change unprecedented in recorded human history. A drop in average surface temperatures, depletion of the ozone layer and shortened agricultural growing seasons wouldlead to massive famine and starvation, resulting in as many as 2 billion deaths over the following decade.

The good news is that much of the world has come to its senses regarding nuclear weapons. In December 2016, over vociferous objections by the United States and Russia, the United Nations General Assembly voted to hold negotiations in 2017 on a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, leading to their elimination. Incredibly, here’s how the President Obama’s UN Ambassador Robert Wood explained the US objection: “… a treaty banning nuclear weapons will not lead to any further reductions because it will not include the states that possess nuclear weapons. Advocates of a ban treaty say it is open to all, but how can a state that relies on nuclear weapons for its security possibly join a negotiation meant to stigmatize and eliminate them.”

The first week of the negotiations took place at United Nations headquarters in New York the last week of March, with 130 countries participating. On the opening day, Trump’s US Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley held a press briefing outside the conference hall. Flanked by nuclear allies including the UK and France, and claiming to represent almost 40 UN member states, Haley — proudly identifying herself “first and foremost” as a mom, a wife and a daughter, who wants to keep her family safe — announced that they will be boycotting the negotiations.

To realize the full value of a “ban” treaty, we must demand that the nuclear-armed states recognize the existing illegality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons under international law protecting civilians and the environment from the effects of warfare. The governments of these states must finally act to meet their disarmament obligations under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and customary international law, and participate in good faith in the negotiations as unanimously mandated by the International Court of Justice in its 1996 Advisory Opinion.

However, it’s unlikely that much progress will be made on nuclear disarmament until there is a significant trend toward demilitarization in general. In 2015, the US spent $596 billion on its military — more than twice as much as China and Russia together, and more than one-third of all the world’s countries combined.

The bottom line is that security must be fundamentally redefined. Instead of “national security” — security of the nation-state — premised on the threat of overwhelming military force and nuclear annihilation, we need a new concept of human security, defined by a previous head of the United Nations Development Program as “the security of people, not just of territory; the security of individuals, not just of nations; security through development, not through arms; security of all the people everywhere — in their homes, in their jobs, in their streets, in their communities and in their environment.” This new concept of human security is “universal, global and indivisible.”

Addressing nuclear dangers must take place in a much broader framework, taking into account the interface between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons and militarism in general, the humanitarian and long-term environmental consequences of nuclear war, and the fundamental incompatibility of nuclear weapons with democracy and human well-being.

Nuclear disarmament should serve as the leading edge of a global trend towards demilitarization and redirection of military expenditures to meet human needs and protect the environment.

We must reject the apocalyptic narrative and summon the imaginations of people everywhere to envision a vastly different future. There is no inevitability to the course of history, and a mobilized citizenry can redirect it toward a positive future.

Progress towards a global society that is fairer, peaceful and ecologically sustainable is interdependent. We are unlikely to get far on any of these objectives without progress on all. They are not “preconditions” for disarmament, but, together with disarmament, are preconditions for human survival. In our relationships both with each other and the planet, we are now hard up against the choice Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. warned about 50 years ago: nonviolence or nonexistence.

Copyright, Truthout.

Jacqueline Cabasso is executive director of the Western States Legal Foundation and North American coordinator of Mayors for Peace. Follow her on Twitter: @JackieCabasso.